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Abstract—Face liveness detection has become a widely used
technique with a growing importance in various authentication
scenarios to withstand spoofing attacks. Existing methods that
perform liveness detection generally focus on designing intelligent
classifiers or customized hardware to differentiate between the
image or video samples of a real legitimate user and the imitated
ones. Although effective, they can be resource-consuming and
detection results may be sensitive to environmental changes.
In this paper, we take iris movement as a significant liveness
sign and propose a simple and efficient liveness detection system
named IriTrack. Users are required to move their eyes along
with a randomly generated poly-line, and trajectories of irises
are then used as evidences for liveness detection. IriTrack allows
checking liveness by using data collected during user-device in-
teractions. We implemented a prototype and conducted extensive
experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed system.
The results show that IriTrack can fend against spoofing attacks
with a moderate and adjustable time overhead.
Index Terms—Liveness detection, iris tracking, face spoofing
attacks, biometric verification, authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, biometric authentication has been widelyused as a reliable and convenient way of user identification
and access control [1]. Among all types of biometric features
(e.g., fingerprint, voice, retina, and palm veins), facial char-
acteristics gain increasing significance as digital images or
videos can be easily captured by cameras readily available
on smartphones and other mobile devices [2]. Thus face
authentication becomes popular in a wide range of application
scenarios. Examples include SmartGate developed by the Aus-
tralian Border Force and the New Zealand customers services
for automated border passing [3], HSBC’s online banking for
allowing customs to open a new account using a selfie [4], and
Windows Hello face authentication in Windows 10 for logging
in or unlocking one’s Microsoft Passport [5]. The popularity
of face authentication is also evidenced by the predicted global
market growth at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of
9.5% from 2015 to 2022 [6].
However, a large body of research has demonstrated the
vulnerability of face authentication systems under spoof at-
tacks, where an adversary attempts to spoof the authentication
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system by mimicking facial features of a legitimate user [7].
Based on the object used, the existing methods for spoofing a
face authentication system can be roughly classified into four
categories, namely, picture-based attacks, video-based attacks,
mask-based attacks, and 2D/3D model attacks. For instance,
an adversary in photo spoofing attacks can feed a photo of a
specific face to a recognition system, while in video spoofing
attacks, a video can be presented to provide more sequential
information, e.g., environmental changes and transformations
of facial components.
To defend against spoofing attacks, face liveness detection is
proposed to distinguish between the image or video samples
of a legitimate on-site user and the imitated ones [8]. For
instance, when applying for a new bank account, the applicant
may be required to take specific actions as an evidence of
liveness. The face authentication system is thus decomposed
into two logically independent processes: face liveness detec-
tion and face recognition. Usually, the former is launched to
ensure that the image or video samples are provided lively and
by the genuine users, while the latter leverages these samples
to determine whether the user is authorized. In this paper, we
focus on the liveness detection process and aim at designing
efficient solutions.
Face liveness detection has been studied over the past
decade [9]. Existing methods can be divided into two main
categories according to the features used for drawing con-
clusions. The first category mainly focuses on extracting
static features from single images to derive differences of
environmental features (e.g., textures and light) between the
image displaying surfaces and real faces [10–16]. These meth-
ods directly capture images and use them as input, which
simplifies the procedure of collecting the necessary input data.
However, the simplicity of input data makes them sensitive to
environmental factors (e.g., illumination and image quality),
which can have a severe impact on detection accuracy. The
second category resorts to sequential images or videos to
detect changes in environmental features or facial motions
so as to match those changes with real situations [2, 17–26].
These approaches can better fend against spoofing attacks with
a high detection accuracy. However, these approaches usually
suffer from high computational and storage complexity as they
introduce cumbersome operations, e.g., applying deep learning
algorithms on consecutive images.
Inspired by existing studies which demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of performing analyses over eye movements [1, 26–
28], we explore the feasibility of detecting face liveness using
iris trajectory caused by intentional eye movements. Although
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2eye movement is an important sign of liveness, the following
observations make it an extremely challenging task to precisely
track the iris for face liveness detection. First, eye movements,
stimulated by user-device interactions, usually introduce sig-
nificant noise, e.g., an unconscious change of gaze of a user
can lead to frequent and unexpected eye movements [29].
Second, hardware-defined image adjustment strategies vary
greatly in cameras and lead to different transformations of
captured images, setting barriers to exact comparisons between
actual and expected eye trajectories. For instance, a horizontal
flip is usually applied to front cameras, making captured eye
trajectories reversed. Finally, complex interaction patterns im-
prove the security in defending against spoof attacks, but also
reduce efficiency due to longer detection duration. Therefore,
the trade-offs among detection accuracy, efficiency, and system
security should be carefully studied.
To address these problems, we propose IriTrack, an effi-
cient system to perform liveness detection by tracking iris
changes of users. IriTrack collects iris positions and uses the
derived trajectories to draw a conclusion. It requires no special
hardware, and can therefore be used on any device equipped
with a camera and a display. The main idea of the proposed
system is to trade data acquisition complexity for computation
complexity, which can be suitable for many applications.
We conducted experiments to test the sensitivities for eyes
to track among different angles with various parameter combi-
nations, by which we balance the trade-off between detection
efficiency and accuracy. Experimental results demonstrate that
IriTrack outperforms the state-of-the-art in terms of detection
accuracy, with a moderate time overhead. IriTrack is also
robust in environmental condition changes, such as light
intensity and face-camera distance.
The main contribution in this paper is two-fold:
• We propose IriTrack, a liveness detection system based
on eye movement tracking which works on commercial
devices with the ability of image capturing and data
processing. IriTrack achieves computational simplicity
and efficiency, without the need for training complex
detection models.
• We introduce a probability-based random pattern genera-
tion method to increase the ability for defending against
potential attacks and to balance system performance. In
order to get rid of the influence of unconscious eye
movement on similarity evaluation, we propose a method
to compare the skeleton of displayed patterns against
collected eye trajectories.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We
present potential spoofing attacks and briefly summarize ex-
isting literatures in Section II. We describe the basic idea of
IriTrack and highlight the challenges in Section III. Then, we
present the design details of IriTrack in Section IV, followed
by a security analysis in Section V. The implementation of
IriTrack in a commercial device is discussed in Section VI and
evaluated for efficiency and security in Section VII. Finally,
we discuss the limitations of the proposed system in Section
VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first present typical spoofing attacks that
circumvent face recognition systems, and then briefly review
existing methods for face liveness detection.
A. Facial Spoofing Attacks
Generally, face recognition systems extract the identity of
a face from one or multiple consecutive images. A common
idea to deceive face recognition systems is to present facial
image samples obtained from the intended target user [18, 30].
According to the sources from which facial image samples are
obtained, facial spoofing attacks can be categorized as follows:
Picture-based attacks. Displaying face images such as pho-
tos or paintings is a convenient way to spoof face recognition
systems. An adversary can offer face recognition systems with
pictures of the target user to allow required facial features
being detected.
Video-based attacks. Similar to pictures, videos are able to
expose specific face features. More importantly, videos usually
have the ability to provide face recognition systems with
necessary sequential information about environmental changes
and transformations of facial components.
2D/3D model attacks. An adversary can build 2D or 3D
models of a valid user, which enables transformations of
facial components as well as environmental conditions. By
adjusting animations of each element, these models can be
highly customizable.
Mask-based attacks. To impersonate face features while
preserving environmental conditions, another straightforward
idea is to equip an adversary with a face mask.
B. Summary of Typical Face Liveness Detection Methods
Recently, many face liveness detection methods have been
proposed to determine whether image samples are captured
from a real user. According to the features they use, we can
classify them into two main categories, each of which can
further be classified into sub-categories, as shown in Table I.
Static features. Static features are referred as features
that contain no transformations, or the alterations can all be
regarded as extraneous. They can be divided into three types:
the first two types are texture features and structure features,
which in most cases can be obtained from single images, while
the third type is human physical characteristics, which can be
directly sensed by special hardware.
Texture features describe the appearance of specific objects
and environmental conditions, e.g., the complexity of colour
components within faces [10–12]. While structure features
depict the information of captured images in its composition
[13, 14]. For instance, the size of captured faces can be
used as a clue for face liveness detection. Methods based on
static features ignore transformation information in images.
Thus, those methods usually take single images as input.
Analyses over single image draw conclusions by contrasting
differences between real faces and fake faces in shapes and
details [10, 11, 31–33], as the displayed surface of a fake
face usually exhibits detectable characteristics, e.g., colour
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TYPICAL FACE LIVENESS DETECTION METHODS
Category Sub-category Samples of Typical Features
Static
feature
extraction
Texture features
Local binary pattern [10]
Colour [11, 12]
Structure features
Diffusion speed [13]
Image quality [14]
Physical characteristics
Skin Temperature [15]
Face Depth [16]
Dynamic
feature
analysis
Texture comparison
Texture change [17–19]
Colour entropy [20]
Structure comparison Optical flow [21, 22]
Facial motion detection
Eye blinking [24]
Pupil dynamics [23]
Eye movement [2, 25, 26]
differences, variety in image qualities, etc. Kim et al. [10]
proposed an approach to distinguish a real live face from
a masked face by differentiating both frequency and texture
features. Dong et al. [11] proposed a liveness detection system,
which utilizes the gradient of each colour channel in static
images to distinguish between real and fake faces.
These methods are generally computationally inexpensive
since they perform analysis only on single images, rather than
on videos or sequential images. Moreover, using single images
as input reduces the duration of capturing images, ensuring
quick response times. However, they might be sensitive to
illumination and image quality, as features extracted from
single images contain limited information and easily affected
by noise. Thus, they can be error-prone and unstable in varying
environmental conditions.
Human physical characteristics are revealed to describe
some properties that only a real person could own, e.g., skin
temperature and skin resistance [15, 16]. To read features of
this kind, in most cases, special hardware must be imple-
mented to sense the data of interest. Such a detection can be
of high accuracy as well as good efficiency since sensors can
respond instantly with high precision. However, the hardware
requirements would be an obstacle as such sensors bring
extra implementation and maintenance cost. In addition, these
special hardware may not be available on legacy devices.
Dynamic features. Generally, methods based on dynamic
feature analyses take videos or sequential images as input,
which provide transformation information of environmental
and facial components in time series. Methods of this category
try to make a judgement by matching environmental and facial
changes with real situations [2, 17–26].
Czajka et al. [23] proposed a solution based on analyses over
changes of human irises. The method is based on the fact that
human irises would have their size changed in different light
intensity levels while printed irises would have no reaction
to such changes. Chan et al. [17] presented a method by
computing changes of both facial and environmental textures
with and without an extra light source (e.g., a camera’s flash).
They extracted 534 features based on 4 descriptors of faces and
background, which are fed to an SVM classifier for liveness
detection. The method requires strong stimulation (e.g., flash
dot
slipper
angle
Fig. 1. A pattern sample in IriTrack, which contains 4 dots, 3 line segments,
and 2 angles. A slipper is employed to direct users’ attention between dots.
light) applied directly to user faces, which may affect the user
experiences.
Compared with the methods based on single image analyses,
methods in this category employ facial and environmental
changes, which can better defend against spoofing attacks, but
also enlarge the detection duration. The requirement of input
data can increase storage overhead for capturing and saving
images. The computational complexity is relatively high, as
they perform analysis over a series of frames.
We pay special attention to solutions which take eye actions
(e.g., movements and blinking) as a sign of liveness. Several
methods need to precisely extract eye positions and require
special helmet-like hardware or cameras [2, 25]. Czajka [23]
proposed a solution which uses pupil reacts to light changes
for liveness detection. In order to capture pupil dynamics
(i.e., size), it requires changes of environmental light intensity,
starting from complete darkness, which may be infeasible in
practical usage. Moreover, pupil size can be altered in different
psychological states (e.g., stress, relaxation, and drowsiness),
leading to degradation of detection accuracy. Liu et al. [26]
uses simple and unaltered patterns, making them less reliable
in fending against spoofing attacks.
The system proposed in this paper captures and analyses
motions of human eyes for liveness detection. Compared with
existing methods, IriTrack needs neither pre-computation nor
storage of additional data for training classifiers. It is also
robust to environmental changes, such as light intensity and
face-camera distance.
III. MOTIVATION
In this section, we present the basic idea of IriTrack, based
on which we then give our reason for extracting similarity
by comparing angles and probe into the feasibility for eyes
tracking along with typical angles.
A. Basic Idea
The idea of IriTrack is inspired by the widely used screen
lock pattern systems in smartphones, where lines are drawn
by a user over 9 or more dots displayed on the screen and
then compared with a pre-defined pattern by an authorized
user. The screen is unlocked if the two patterns are exactly
the same. Similarly, IriTrack can make decision by comparing
the trajectory of a user’s eye movements with a pre-defined
patten consisting of a certain number of dots and lines.
The setting of pre-defined patterns is crucial to the security
of a liveness detection system. A straightforward way is to
be consistent with the screen lock pattern systems, where an
4authorized user can set a customized pattern in advance. Al-
though simple, it may result in vulnerability as the pre-defined
patterns could be leaked to potential attackers. Additionally,
it also imposes the burden of pattern management to users,
especially those of different liveness detection applications.
Therefore, we offload the pattern setting operation to the
liveness detection system, where a randomly generated pattern
is displayed on the screen for a user.
As one has no prior knowledge about the pattern, it is
difficult for a user to determine when to change his attentions.
In order to help users gaze their gaze in an accurate way,
IriTrack uses lines to guide users’ attention. More specifically,
in IriTrack, a poly-line with dots inside will be generated and
displayed on the screen. A user has to draw the poly-line by
moving his/her eyes. The trajectory of his/her iris positions is
recorded and compared with the given line to get a conclusion.
For clarity, we make several definitions as illustrated in
Fig. 1. In each detection procedure, a pattern, which takes
the form of an acyclic poly-line composed of connected line
segments, will be randomly generated. We defer the generation
strategy to the next section. Each pair of adjacent line segments
possess an angle seated at their joint. Endpoints of each line
segment are referred to as dots. Correspondingly, eye positions
in captured images are called points.
IriTrack differs from the widely used pattern-based screen-
lock systems. Patterns in screen lock systems are pre-defined
by users and used as a way of authentication. However,
patterns in IriTrack are randomly generated and used only for
liveness detection, which is launched before the authentication
process performed by face recognition. The randomness is
employed in IriTrack to greatly reduce the possibility of
forecasting a pattern by a spoofing attacker.
B. Challenges
It is a non-trivial task to instantiate the above-mentioned
idea, due to the following challenges:
Unconscious movement of eyes. Since IriTrack aims at
tracking changes in iris positions caused by users’ attention
shifts, the fundamental factor affecting the detected result is
whether one’s eye movements have an anticipant represen-
tation. Existing studies [29] indicate that one’s gaze could
exhibit unconscious rapid changes, which leads to unexpected
eye movements. What’s worse, blinking eyes would also
introduce noises in the observed iris trajectory.
Transformations of captured images. The cameras, oper-
ating systems, and hardware in devices can vary greatly due
to various manufacturers, which causes the obtained images
rendered in different representations. For instance, a surprising
observation in our experiments is that some cameras record
images in a horizontally flipped way while others are not.
These uncertain transformations make the exact comparison
between eye trajectories and patterns meaningless. Therefore,
we should try to eliminate the impact of such an uncertainty.
Trade-offs between efficiency and accuracy. As described
above, adjusting the number and length of line segments
as well as the degree of angles results in various patterns.
Obviously, a longer poly-line with more line segments and
Fig. 2. Measured average deviations of angles. A lower deviation means the
angle is easier for tracking.
angles will prolong the duration of detection, but also help
remove noises in trajectory extraction and thereby improve
detection accuracy. Thus, it is desirable to strike a balance
between efficiency and accuracy.
C. Sensitivity of Tracking Angles
In our design, users are required to shift their gaze along
with a randomly generated pattern, where the recorded trajec-
tories are then compared with the given poly-lines for making
detection conclusion. However, unconscious eye movements
along with eye blinking would result in unpredictable positions
of irises, which causes indeterministic deviation from the poly-
lines. Besides, transformations due to hardware diversity have
an influence on the phase of similarity comparison. Thus, it
is extremely difficult to achieve an exact match between the
poly-lines and collected trajectories.
In order to address this challenge, we turn to track eye
movements at the critical endpoints in the poly-line. More
specifically, we view the angles between each pair of adjacent
line segments as the skeleton of a pattern, and attempt to
measure the similarity between the skeleton and the eye
movements when angles occur.
To validate the feasibility of the above-mentioned idea, we
conduct experiments to evaluate the sensitivity of tracking eye
movements at angles (cf. Section VII-B for more details). In
the experiments, two lines with an angle at their conjunct
endpoint are displayed on the screen, and the positions of
pupils are recorded when testers shift their gaze along the
given poly-line. We measure the angle from the tracked irises’
positions, and then calculate the deviation of a measured angle
from its real value. Methods for locating iris positions and
measuring angles are deferred to the next section.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that angles on
a poly-line are restricted to 6 typical degrees, i.e., Γ =
{30deg, 45deg, 60deg, 90deg, 120deg, 150deg}. Experimental
results are shown in Fig. 2, where the two numbers at each
point indicate the real value of an angle and its deviation,
respectively. From the results, we can learn that it is possible
to track eye movements for typical angles. But the sensitivity
varies among different angles, e.g., angles of 45deg and
90deg are more difficult to track, which should be carefully
considered in pattern design.
5Fig. 3. The workflow of IriTrack. A random pattern is displayed on the screen
when receiving a request from a user, and the user is required to draw the
pattern with his/her eyes. Then, the recorded iris trajectories along with the
original pattern are taken as inputs for similarity measurement. Finally, the
detection result (i.e., pass or fail) is returned to the user.
IV. DESIGN OF IRITRACK
In this section, we present the workflow and design details
of IriTrack.
A. System Overview
We build our system based on two primary facts [29].
First, one can keep staring at a specific object for a relatively
short time (e.g., 5 seconds). Second, tracking any specific
object with eyes causes detectable changes of relative distances
between eye regions and the center of irises in the prerequisite
of keeping one’s head still.
IriTrack’s system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3, and is
mainly composed of three components, namely pattern gener-
ation, iris tracking, and similarity measurement. The design
details of each module will be described in the following
subsections.
The workflow of liveness detection can be described as
follows: IriTrack randomly generates and displays a pattern on
the screen as requested by a user. Then, the user is required to
follow the pattern with his eyes and the trajectories of irises
can be recorded by a camera. During this process, the user
is required to try his best to keeping his head still. Finally,
the collected trajectories and the given pattern are fed to the
similarity measurement module for drawing a conclusion.
Since liveness detection samples must be used for recogni-
tion as well, the liveness face images, from which iris patterns
are retrieved in IriTrack, do not affect the recognition by cer-
tain cutting-edge recognition algorithms if used as recognition
input. As face recognition is logically independent of liveness
detection, we focus on the design details of IriTrack hereafter.
B. Pattern Generation
As stated, a pattern is a poly-line consisting of line seg-
ments. To help users concentrate and balance their tracking
speed, a slipper which moves along with patterns at a constant
speed is also displayed. All patterns need to be arbitrarily
generated to avoid potential spoofing attacks. In our design,
we take consideration of the following two factors in pattern
generation: 1) the capability in fending against spoofing at-
tacks, and 2) time efficiency of tracking iris positions.
Algorithm 1 IsNextDotNeeded
Require: k as the index of the next dot to be generated
Ensure: whether a new dot should be added to the pattern
1: if n < 3 then
2: return true
3: else
4: prob← PL(k)
5: rand← generate a random number between 0 and 1
6: return rand ≤ prob
7: end if
A pattern P is denoted by P = (A,L), where A and L
are angle set and line segment set in the pattern, respectively.
The generated patterns should be random enough, or attackers
may take preparations in advance if a pattern can be easily
speculated. To allow the randomness of patterns, we apply
probabilities when generating angles and lines. Recall that Γ
contains typical angles from which an angle in a pattern P can
be selected. For each angle θ ∈ Γ, we associate a weight ωθ,
which indicates the probability of accurately following such
an angle by eye movements. The notations used in the rest of
this paper are summarized in Table II.
We denote PΓ(θ) as the probability of setting the current
angle to be θ (θ ∈ Γ). PΓ(θ) can be calculated as follows:
PΓ(θ) =
ωθ∑
θi∈Γ ωθi
(1)
where Γ = {30deg, 45deg, 60deg, 90deg, 120deg, 150deg}.
It can be noted that the higher the number of dots used, the
more difficult a spoofing attack succeeds. Let n be the total
number of dots in a generated pattern. Here, we assume n ≥ 4
(i.e., at least two angles in a pattern) for security considera-
tions. There would be 6n−2 possible combinations of angles.
Meanwhile, line segments appearing in a pattern are randomly
selected from a pre-defined set L =
{
l0, l1, . . . , l|L|
}
, thus
there would be |L|n−1 possible combinations of line segments.
It should be noted that increasing the number of dots can cause
increment of the time spent gathering iris tracks, and also make
users impatient, which can affect the accuracy of tracking. As
the slipper moves at a constant speed s, the time cost should
be directly proportional to n.
To achieve a balance between time cost, security against
spoofing attacks, and tracking accuracy, we resort to a
probability-based model of pattern generation, where we start
from a pattern P with only one line segment (i.e., two dots),
and iteratively determines whether a new line (also a new
angle) should be added to the current pattern, as stated in
Algorithm 2.
In each iteration, assume that k − 1 (k ≥ 3) dots already
exist in pattern P , we use PL(k) to denote the probability of
adding the k-th dot in P , as shown in Eq. (2). Algorithm 1
shows how to determine whether a dot should be added.
PL(k) =
{
1, k ≤ 4
1
k−3 , k > 4
(2)
Next, considering the two key factors mentioned in the
beginning of this section, the goodness of the generated
6TABLE II
NOTATIONS USED IN IRITRACK
Notation Description
Γ The set containing typical angle degrees
L The set containing typical lengths of line segments
P A generated pattern
A The set containing angles in P
L The set containing line segments in P
l The total length of line segments in P
n The total amount of dots in P
s The constant moving speed of the slipper in P
C The set containing sequentially recorded eye positions
PΓ(θ) The probability of setting the next angle as θ
PL(k) The probability of adding the k-th dot into a pattern
pattern should be measured to ensure that the pattern is secure
enough to resist against spoofing attacks and requires moderate
tracking time. Given a generated pattern P , we use G(P) to
describe its goodness, which is calculated in Eq. (3).
G(P) = 6n−2 × |L|n−1 × 1
en−1
∏
θi∈A
PΓ(θi) (3)
The coefficient 6n−2 × |L|n−1 is a measure of the ran-
domness of P which is directly associated with the strength
in fending against spoofing attacks. The denominator en−1
ensures that a pattern with less line segments is more likely to
be accepted as the time overhead for tracking can be reduced.
Additionally, we employ an exponential function to introduce
a rapid drop in goodness when the time overhead increases.
The rest signifies the efficiency for eyes to track angles. A
better pattern P should have a higher value of G(P). A pre-
defined constant G0 is introduced and each valid pattern P
must satisfy the condition G(P) ≥ G0. The setting of G0 will
be described in Section VII.
Moreover, as the pattern would be displayed in the screen, it
should be guaranteed that all dots are placed within the bound
of the screen. Meanwhile, to reduce the confusion for users
when tracking, we stipulate artificially that all lines and dots
in a pattern are not allowed to overlap.
Finally, the above conditions are considered together to
determines whether to return the current pattern or generate a
new pattern (Line 9 in Algorithm 2).
C. Iris Tracking
The tracking module utilizes the embedded camera to grab
facial images, which are used to identify the center of each
iris and track the movements of irises.
As the module starts working, the camera acquires images
at a fixed frequency. Given a facial image, the Daugman’s
integrodifferential operator [34] is employed to detect the
center of irises. To find a circular path that fixes the contour
of each iris, the algorithm tries every combination of center
position (x, y) and radius r to detect the path with the
Algorithm 2 PatternGeneration
Require: Γ, L
Ensure: Pattern P
1: while true do
2: A ← {}
3: L ← {a randomly selected line from L}
// There are 2 dots in the current pattern.
// Index of the next dot would be |A|+ 3.
4: while IsNextDotNeeded(|A|+ 3) do
5: A ← A∪ {select an angle from Γ}
6: L ← L ∪ {select a line from L}
7: end while
8: P ← (A,L)
9: if G(P) ≥ G0 and
all dots of P seat within the screen and
no overlap between dots and lines then
10: return P
11: end if
12: end while
maximum change of pixel values. It can be expressed by the
following equation:
max
r,x0,y0
∣∣∣∣Gσ(r) ∗ ∂∂r
∮
I(x, y)
2pir
ds
∣∣∣∣ (4)
where I is the input image, I(x, y) is the pixel value in the
corresponding position (x, y), r is the radius of the detected
area, and Gσ(r) is the Gaussian smoothing function.
As we need only transformations of iris positions, the
coordinates with values of x0 and y0 are recorded, but the
detected radius of each iris r is simply ignored.
D. Similarity Measurement
As shown in Fig. 3, a randomly generated pattern along
with the collected eye trajectories would be passed to our
measurement module. The main task of this stage is to recover
the skeleton from eye movements and compare the similarity
between the skeleton with the given pattern.
Based on the assumption that the gaze of eyes moves at a
uniform speed, the coordinates of tracked dots can be propor-
tionally divided according to the length of each line segment.
Given a pattern P = (A,L), let L = {l1, l2, . . . , l|L|}, where
lv (1 ≤ v ≤ |L|) is the length of the v-th line in P . The
total length of the poly-line can be denoted by l =
∑
lv∈L lv .
Denoting C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} as the set of recorded dots
where m = |C|, the position of the i-th dot in the pattern can
be recovered as follows:
(xi, yi) =
 C1, i = 1Cm, i = nCj , otherwise (5)
where j = ml
∑
v<i lv . Sequentially taking three dots re-
covered from the tracked points, the angles in degrees can
be easily obtained using the law of Cosines. According to
Eq. (5), distances between the adjacent dots are the rule to
recover relative positions among dots, while angles calculated
7consecutively are the evidence to judge whether the movement
of irises are similar to the given pattern.
In IriTrack, the PC screen and camera captured images
usually have two different coordinate systems. Since we use
angles for similarity measurement, the calculation involved is
irrelevant to the coordinate systems.
As mentioned above, we assign weights to different angles.
An angle with a higher weight can be followed with less dis-
parity, and the difference between the angle and its measured
value can be more credible. We introduce the matching cost C
to describe the dissimilarity between the original pattern and
the tracked trajectory, as shown in Eq. (6):
C =
1∑
θi∈A ωθi
×
∑
θi∈A
(ωθi ×
∣∣∣θi − θ′i∣∣∣) (6)
where θi is the actual value of an angle in the given pattern,
and θ
′
i represents its measured result. A pre-defined constant
threshold C0 is involved. If C ≤ C0, we consider that the face
in front of the camera comes from a live person.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As described above, IriTrack uses eye movements as the
evidence for determining the liveness of a presented face. In
this section, we discuss the security guarantees provided by
IriTrack against the potential attacks presented in Section II.
Picture-based attacks. Faces recorded by pictures (e.g.,
photos) are inherently different from real faces, because the
irises in pictures are static.. As a result, to cheat IriTrack, an
attacker must move the picture along with a same path as the
displayed poly-line. However, this would result in a relatively
large range of face movement. By analysing the region of face
movements during this process, IriTrack can easily figure out
that the trajectory is derived mainly from face movements,
rather than iris movements.
Video-based attacks. Videos recording eye movements
may be used to deceive IriTrack. In order to succeed in passing
the verification, an attacker should present a video displaying a
series of eye movements which match the generated poly-line.
As the poly-line is generated with a high degree of randomness
(e.g., the length of segments and the degree of angles), it is
difficult to spoof IriTrack without a prior knowledge of the
displayed ploy-line. Experimental results will be presented in
Section VII.
2D/3D model attacks. Although a model can have move-
able facial components, changing the movements of facial
parts usually needs time-consuming reprogramming. Thus,
a time-out rule can be involved to prevent programming
operations. That is, IriTrack can trigger a time-out rule and
terminate the detection process with a rejection once the
tracking module fails to record eye movement within a certain
period.
Mask-based attacks. Masks of faces expose specific facial
features to IriTrack. Similar to pictures, masks are not able
to provide irises transformations as eyes within masks are
not moveable. Thus, the same idea of detecting pictures
attacks can be applied. As a variation of mask-based attacks,
an adversary may use a mask which have some level of
(a) Captured raw image (b) Image with detected regions
Fig. 4. Sample of locating the right iris in a face. The region of a user’s
face is first detected, within which the region of right eye then gets extracted.
Finally, the center of right iris could be obtained.
transparency around eyes such that a camera still detect iris
movements. We will discuss this special case in Section VIII.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of IriTrack on a PC with
Windows 10. This section presents the implementation details.
During pattern generation, we use a pseudo-random number
generator to simulate probabilities. An alternative way is to
obtain random number generator via RANDOM.ORG [35].
The tracking module utilizes OpenCV to invoke image-
related functions, e.g., recognizing regions of faces and eyes.
We use pre-trained Haar classifiers to search for regions of
the largest face as well as both the left and right eyes. With
the help of the eye classifier, IriTrack can successfully detect
regions of eyes either with or without glasses. By limiting
search within the regions of eyes, the locating algorithm is
greatly accelerated. Fig. 4 demonstrates the result of recog-
nizing regions of interest within a captured face.
As stated earlier, IriTrack is supposed to capture points at
a fixed frequency. When extracting angles from the tracked
points, the captured points can be proportionally divided based
on the lengths of line segments. In other words, the position of
a given dot can be derived by the point in the corresponding
index from the obtained point sequence as illustrated by Eq.
(5). In our implementation, for each dot in a pattern, we
select the corresponding point as well as the 2 nearby points.
That is, we take 3 points for each dot as its candidates. We
maintain those selected candidate sets in a list, from which
we sequentially take 3 adjacent sets to calculate angles. For
27 combinations of coordinates respectively selected from
the 3 sets, we can get the containing angle by applying the
arc-cosine function. Finally, we can simply select the most
frequent value from the 27 candidates as the final result.
However, in our experiment, we notice that irises’ positions
may not be strictly periodically recorded as the processing time
may differ for each frame, especially in the situation where
some irrelevant background tasks are executed concurrently
in the host device. The difference between sampling intervals
may cause a significant effect in positioning interested dots
as well as measuring angles. As a result, some revisions
must be applied to fix the inaccuracy caused by the uneven
scatter of analyses in time series. In our system, we use
the captured timestamp of two adjacent points to predicate
the position of the user’s gaze in a specific moment. When
tracking the position of the user’s irises, the tracking module
8is designed to record the x and y coordinates as well as the
timestamp when the currently analysed frame captured. We
denote (tM , (xM , yM )) to be the extracted information from
a center point M where tM represents the time when the
position of M is concluded. Having the corresponding data
of point M and N , we can predicate the position of a point
O, which is supposed to be recorded at a specific moment tO.
xO = xM +
tO − tM
tN − tM × (xN − xM )
yO = yM +
tO − tM
tN − tM × (yN − yM )
(7)
By introducing the timestamp based correction, we can then
recover the turning points in a more precise way. We subtract
the timestamp of the last recorded point from the timestamp of
the first point to extract the duration of the whole process so we
can divide the time gap according to the lengths of generated
line segments to get the recording moment of turning points.
VII. EVALUATION
The goals of our evaluation are: 1) exploring parameters
that achieve a balance between time overhead and accuracy of
the detection process, 2) showing the efficiency and security
of our system by comparing with state-of-the-art methods, 3)
demonstrating the system performance with various pattern
scales, and 4) estimating the reliability of the proposed system
under varying environmental conditions.
A. Preliminaries
Methods to Compare. We select several representing live-
ness detection systems for performance comparison, which are
listed as follows:
• IriTrack, which is the main work of this paper. The
timestamp-based optimization is involved in similarity
measurement.
• ncIriTrack, which is the same as IriTrack except the
timestamp-based optimization.
• FlashSys, which is the flash-related face liveness detec-
tion system proposed by Chan et al. [17].
• OptFlowSys, which is proposed by Bao et al. [21] to
detect face liveness based on the optical flow field.
Testbed. The system is deployed on a PC, with 16GB RAM
and one Intel Dual-Core i7-6600U CPU. The main camera
carries an OV5693 sensor and captures images with a size of
640 × 480 in pixels. 18 volunteers participated in evaluating
the accuracy of the selected methods. The heads of volunteers
should be kept as still as possible in detection process.
As described in Section V, video-based attacks are capable
of imitating iris movements of real users. Thus, we mainly
ponder the possibility for video attacks to spoof IriTrack. We
assume that a potential adversary can learn typical parameters
of IriTrack, such as angle type and segment length. To sim-
ulate these attacks, we record 50 different video clips (with
random combinations of these parameters) for each of the 18
volunteers (i.e., 900 clips in total) with consistent indoor light
intensity of 350lux. We also test several scenarios with varying
environmental factors to evaluate the flexibility of the proposed
system against environmental changes.
Summary of experimental results.
• Among all potential combinations of parameter values,
we find candidates that achieve a better balance between
time overhead and detection accuracy, i.e., s = 500 and
L = {150, 200, 250}. Angles in 45deg and 90deg are
hard for following so weights for these two kinds are
relatively low.
• The average time overhead of liveness detection with
IriTrack is roughly 3,845ms, which is dominated by
the tracking module. IriTrack achieves higher detection
accuracy in detecting 2D spoofing attacks, with an F1
score of 95.4%.
• The probability-based random pattern generation model
can reach a balance between processing time and detec-
tion accuracy.
• The performance of IriTrack can be maintained in a
relatively stable and high level when environmental con-
ditions change. Lowering circumstance brightness can
help increase detection accuracy.
B. Evaluation of Impacts of Parameters on Time and Accuracy
Now, we investigate how the time cost and accuracy vary
according to different values of the parameters in IriTrack.
As stated above, a slipper moving along the poly-line
displayed on the screen is employed to help users to focus on
the path and adjust the movement speed of their eyes. Thus, the
time spent on iris tracking is positively correlated with the ratio
of the total length of the given poly-line to the speed of the
slipper. Intuitively, a shorter path with a faster slipper would
significantly reduce the time interval for collecting trajectories.
However, a fast-moving slipper may make users feel uncom-
fortable and also reduce the number of captured points, leading
to a significant decrease of measurement accuracy. Therefore,
we focus on trade-offs between time overhead and accuracy
with varying parameter settings.
TABLE III
PARAMETERS USED FOR GENERATING PATTERNS
# angle
types
# line
lengths
# speed
types
# unique
patterns
# tests
per pattern
# total
tests
6 5 6 180 40 7,200
Dataset. In order to clearly understand the impact of
different parameters, the generated pattern is determined and
simplified into a poly-line consisting of only 3 dots (i.e., 2
segments with a single angle). We assign the two segments
with the same length, thus the total length of the line segments
in a pattern, l, is twice the length of each segment. As
summarized in Table III, all combinations of parameters θ,
l and s result in 180 unique patterns. Given a specific pattern,
4 volunteers are involved and each completes 10 times. The
following figures show the average results of each pattern.
The average time cost of the 6 typical kinds of angles with
varying s and l are plotted in Fig. 5. We can find that at
each fixed moving speed, the time spent on tracking grows
9Fig. 5. Average time cost with various speeds and line lengths. For each
combination, we calculate the average time cost of all kinds of angles in Γ.
Fig. 6. The average matching deviation with varying speed s and total length
l. For each combination, values are derived from the average of measured
deviation of all kinds of angles in Γ.
as the line length increases. Thus, shorter lines contribute to
a reduction in tracking time. When fixing the line length,
speeding up the slipper’s movement also reduces the time
overhead for tracking. Thus, to achieve more efficiency in
terms of time cost, combinations of shorter lines and higher
speed are preferred.
With the same settings as in Fig. 5, we exhibit the average
matching deviation of angles with varying speeds and line
lengths in Fig. 6. We observe two typical combinations leading
to higher deviation, which are referred to as underspeed and
overspeed cases. The underspeed cases happen when setting
a low speed with relatively longer lines, e.g., the rightmost
two bars at the speed of 100, as users would unconsciously
try to predict the position of the slipper, making the tracking
speed vary during the verification process. The overspeed cases
happen when setting a high speed with relatively shorter lines,
e.g., the length of 100 at a speed larger than 100. This is
because shorter lines restrict eye movements with in a rather
small area on the screen, making IriTrack more difficult to
recover trajectory accurately.
Parameter selection result. An appropriate combination of
line length and moving speed leads to a better balance between
accuracy and time efficiency. According to the results depicted
in Figs. 5 and 6, we set s = 500 and L = {150, 200, 250}
hereafter.
Recall that each angle is associated with a weight, indicating
the probability of it being selected when generating a pattern.
Now, we describe the rationale for weight assignment. Among
the 6 angles, the average of disparities between the measured
and actual angles reaches a value of 20deg. However, consider-
Fig. 7. The average matching deviation for different angles with various line
lengths when s = 500.
ing angles of 45deg and 90deg which are harder for tracking, to
ensure the performance for these 2 kinds, we set C0 = 25deg
which is their average deviation.
For each of selected 6 kinds of angles, by calculating the
frequency that a corresponding test case has a disparity no
larger than C0, we assign such frequencies as weights, as
shown in Table IV. In Fig. 7, we demonstrate the matching
deviation for each angle using the parameters recommended
above. For instance, angles of 45deg and 90deg are relatively
difficult for tracking and thereby their weights are lower than
those of the rest angles.
Based on the probabilities for generating different angles,
PΓ(θ), we utilize the highest, lowest, and average probabilities,
to estimate the goodness of a pattern consisting of a certain
number of angles. In general, a pattern should at least contain
2 angles with a corresponding goodness of 1.4. We take it as
the baseline of goodness and set G0 = 1.4.
TABLE IV
WEIGHTS OF ANGLES
Angle 30deg 45deg 60deg 90deg 120deg 150deg
Weight 0.766 0.566 0.766 0.7 0.8 0.813
C. Evaluation of Performance of IriTrack
Using the parameters determined above, we now evaluate
the performance of IriTrack versus other counterparts. We
employ the well-known accuracy criteria, i.e., precision (in-
dicating the percentage of real faces detected in all instances
detected as real) and recall (indicating the percentage of real
faces detected in all real faces in the ground-truth). Moreover,
F1 is calculated as 2·precision·recallprecision+recall .
Dataset. Each of the 18 volunteers is tested 40 times, which
leads to a total number of 18 × 40 = 720 genuine cases. We
also simulate 720 attack cases, which are conducted as follows:
Considering that the pattern in IriTrack is generated randomly,
we replay a clip selected randomly from the 900 clips to spoof
the targeted detection systems at each round of detection.
Time efficiency. For the 4 selected face liveness detection
systems, we record their average time costs for detection.
OptFlowSys spends the most time as it requires the tester’s
head to swing slowly for several times while detecting the
directional changes of optical flow. On the contrary, FlashSys
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TABLE V
DETECTION RESULTS OF THE TESTED DETECTION SYSTEMS
System Time (ms) Precision Recall F1 score
IriTrack 3,845 95.2% 95.6% 95.4%
ncIriTrack 3,799 85.5% 80.4% 82.9%
FlashSys 3,200 88.2% 92.4% 90.2%
OptFlowSys 7,350 77.6% 78.8% 78.2%
needs the least time, as it captures and compares only two
images in each round of detection, i.e., one without external
light source and the other with flash turned on. However, the
flash light is directly applied to the face of testers during
each procedure, making the system less user-friendly. IriTrack
holds a tolerable time cost, i.e. less than 4 seconds, which is
comparable to that achieved by ncIriTrack.
Accuracy and security. In order to reduce the influence
of environmental factors, the selected methods are tested
simultaneously. Besides tests with real persons, we present
several instances of video attacks. The video attacks are
conducted as follows: A series of video clips recording random
iris movements are prepared in advance, and one video clip
is randomly selected and displayed in front of the camera,
attempting to cheat the liveness detection system.
The detection accuracy of each system is presented in Table
V. IriTrack achieves the best performance in distinguishing
between live real faces and fake faces. In IriTrack, patterns are
generated with a random number of angles and lines, where
the degree of each angle and the length of each line are also
randomly selected from given sets. This greatly reduces the
probability that a video attack successfully predicts a pattern.
The fundamental goal of liveness detection is to be accurate,
e.g., identifying more spoofing attacks in the ground truth, and
avoiding false alarms. Thus, compared with FlashSys, one may
prefer to use IriTrack for achieving higher accuracy with a
slight increase of detection delay.
From the results collected at this stage, we pick 30 subsets,
each of which contains detection results of randomly selected
50 cases (i.e., half with the genuine cases and half with the
attack cases). Then, F1 score of each subset is calculated.
We find that for both FlashSys and OptFlowSys, there are
statistically significant difference with 95% confidence in
comparison with IriTrack using the Student’s t-test.
TABLE VI
LIVENESS DETECTION RESULTS FOR NCIRITRACK AND IRITRACK
Scenario
ncIriTrack IriTrack
Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected
Real face 80.4% 19.6% 95.6% 4.4%
Video 13.6% 86.4% 4.8% 95.2%
The effectiveness of the timestamp-based optimization in
IriTrack can be demonstrated by the comparison between
ncIriTrack and IriTrack, as shown in Table VI. With the help
of timestamps, moving angles of irises can be more precisely
recovered. Therefore, with IriTrack, more legitimate testers
get passed (i.e., 95.6% vs. 80.4%) and more video attacks are
successfully recognized (i.e., 95.2% vs. 86.4%).
Summary of performances. The experiment results show
that with IriTrack, the detection process takes less than 4
seconds and the F1 score reaches 95.4%. Thus, IriTrack owns
the highest detection accuracy with a moderate time overhead.
D. Investigation of Pattern Scales
The performance of IriTrack is largely determined by the
generated patterns. This subsection investigates how the per-
formance varies with patterns in different scales. We classify
all the generated patterns according to the number of angles
they contain.
As stated in the last subsection, time and accuracy are
crucial indicators of performance. Table VII reveals the results
of the experiments, the last column indicates the detection
accuracy when a pattern is tested by video spoofing attacks.
The most complex pattern has the highest security and also
the the highest time overhead. Generally, a pattern with more
angles can certainly possess more line segments as well as
break points, which results in growth of time consumption.
Noticing that over all kinds of patterns, the security can be
maintained in a relatively high level.
Table VII also demonstrates that the probability-based
model for pattern generation provides a flexible way to balance
the tradeoffs between time efficiency and security.
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE OF PATTERNS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF ANGLES
Angle Count Tracking Time Pattern Frequency F1score
3 3,436ms 55% 94.4%
4 3,634ms 30% 95.3%
5 4,246ms 11% 95.6%
6 4,875ms 3% 96.5%
7 5,217ms 1% 98.2%
E. Evaluation of Environmental Impacts
This subsection evaluates the effect of the environment on
the performance of IriTrack, including the light conditions and
face-camera distances.
TABLE VIII
DETECTION RESULTS WITH IRITRACK WHEN ENVIRONMENTAL
BRIGHTNESS VARIES
Intensity (lux) Intuitive description F1 score
1 Indoor, evening, screen light only 96.6%
25 Indoor, evening, with daylight lamp 95.6%
150 Indoor, afternoon, curtain closed 95.2%
350 Indoor, afternoon, natural light 95.4%
830 Indoor, afternoon, near a window 94.2%
2700 Outdoor, afternoon, cloudy 91.7%
10000 Outdoor, afternoon, sunny 91.6%
Light Intensity. In liveness detection systems, images of
users are taken by cameras for further analysis. All previous
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experiments are conducted in a general indoor condition with
a light intensity of 350lux. Next, we keep the brightness of the
displaying screen at the same level (i.e. 250lux) and evaluate
the performance of IriTrack by varying the environmental light
intensities. For video attacks, we keep using the same video
dataset and replay strategy as mentioned earlier. Note that the
device for replaying attack clips has a screen, which increases
the environmental light intensity by 200lux on average.
The results are summarized in Table VIII. We can find
that the detection accuracy in terms of F1 score maintains
at a relatively high level as the environmental light intensity
changes. An intensive sunlight slightly reduces the accuracy
for detecting face regions, because the screen in such a
condition can be comparatively darker, making it harder for
the testers to keep focused.
TABLE IX
DETECTION RESULTS OF IRITRACK WITH VARIOUS DISTANCES BETWEEN
TESTERS AND THE CAMERA.
Distance (cm) 20 22 24 28 32 34 36
Eye traceable × × √ √ √ × ×
F1 score (%) 69.4 76.9 95.2 95.4 95.1 78.2 75.1
Face-Camera Distance. Distance between the face and
camera will influence the size of faces in obtained images,
e.g., a shorter distance helps get a larger face with more details
of iris movements. Daugman’s algorithm used in IriTrack
searches irises with radiuses in a pre-defined range. That is, to
make irises successfully and accurately detected, testers have
to put their heads at a proper distance to the camera so that
each of the captured irises could have an appropriate size for
further detection.
The results are exhibited in Table IX. We can find that the
detection accuracy in terms of F1 score reaches a steady level,
as long as the face-camera distance is appropriate where irises
can be traceable.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Being different from most existing liveness detection meth-
ods, IriTrack does not rely on direct analysis on images
acquired by cameras, thus it needs no online or offline training
of image classifiers for liveness detection. We have shown
its effectiveness in the previous section. This section mainly
discusses issues that might affect its performance in practice.
Compatibility on different devices. Screens displaying
the generated patterns may differ in their physical sizes (in
terms of inches) and effective rendering sizes (in terms of
pixels). A physically small screen may have a larger pixel
density, which makes a line rendered visually shorter. To get a
consistent displaying effect on different devices, the pixels per
inch (PPI) parameter can be involved, which converts lengths
in pixels into values in device-independent inches by simple
multiplications.
Defense against advanced mask-based attacks. As men-
tioned earlier in Section V, an adversary may use a mask
which enables camera-detectable eye movement to spoof
IriTrack. As a liveness detection system, IriTrack is only
responsible for verifying if a user is alive, irrespective of the
user is authorized or not. In general, existing liveness detection
systems which take eye reaction (e.g., movement and blinking)
as an alive sign are vulnerable to such advanced attacks. To
defend against these attacks, static feature analysis approaches
[10, 12] can be incorporated into IriTrack, since masks are
different from real faces in textures.
Assumption on user concentration. It is worth noticing
that the heads of users should be kept as still as possible,
as intensive jitters occur when recognizing face regions by
OpenCV even though positions of a head are changed negligi-
bly. Currently, IriTrack records the global positions of irises for
each frame. In order to improve the steadiness of algorithms
that locate face regions, the iris tracking module can use the
relative positions between a face and the irises to identify the
movement of irises. In this case, such an assumption will no
longer be necessary.
We leave these improvement attempts as future work.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a face liveness detection system
named IriTrack, which performs detection by comparing iris
trajectories with randomly generated patterns. Each module
in IriTrack does not require special hardware and is easy
to implement on commercial devices. Extensive experimental
results demonstrated the effectiveness of IriTrack in fending
against video-based spoofing attacks. In future work, we will
further improve the time efficiency and compatibility of the
proposed system.
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